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Africa should industrialize. Without structural change it cannot sustain recent growth. 
Economies with more diverse and sophisticated industrial sectors tend to grow faster. 
But since 1980 Africa has deindustrialized. The paper shows that between 1975 and 
2005 the size, diversity and sophistication of industry in Africa have all declined. An 
industrialization strategy containing two elements is needed. The first is 
straightforward: refocusing current investment climate reforms on infrastructure, skills, 
and regional integration. These actions alone will not be sufficient, however. Africa 
must also learn to compete through strategies to create an export push, develop 
industrial clusters, and attract task-based production. 
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1 Introduction 
Industry ... is the means by which rapid improvement in Africa’s living 
standards is possible … 
      Kwame  Nkrumah  (1965) 
Africa’s post-independence leaders—like many developing country policy makers in 
the 1960s and 1970s—looked to industrialization as the key to rapid economic growth. 
However, the state-led, import-substituting industries they created were frequently 
uncompetitive and unsustainable. Efforts to spur industrial development in Africa 
largely vanished with the economic collapses and adjustment programmes of the 1980s 
and 1990s.1 
While the last two decades of the twentieth century were boom times for industrial 
development in low- and middle-income countries, industry was moving out of Africa. 
Between 1995 and 2008, manufacturing growth in developing economies was more than 
6 per cent per year, in Africa it was about 3 per cent. Since 1980 industry in Africa has 
declined as a share of both global production and trade (UNIDO 2009), and today, 
Africa’s industrial sector is in many ways less advanced than in the first decade 
following independence. In contrast to much of the rest of the developing world Africa 
has ‘deindustrialized’.2 
This paper addresses the questions: should Africa industrialize and how? Section 2 takes 
up the question of why Africa should industrialize. The post-1995 growth turnaround 
notwithstanding, lack of structural change—the shift of resources from low-productivity 
to higher productivity sectors—limits Africa’s long-term growth prospects. Industry is 
most often the leading high productivity sector, and recent research indicates that 
economies with more diverse and sophisticated industrial sectors tend to grow faster. 
Africa, however, is moving in the opposite direction. Manufacturing value added has 
declined as a share of GDP since the mid-1980s. New evidence on changes in industrial 
production and export sophistication for 18 African economies shows that between 
1975 and 2005 the diversity and sophistication of industrial production and exports have 
declined in most African economies.  
Section 3 begins the discussion of how to industrialize. Agriculture remains the largest 
employer in many of Africa’s economies, and it therefore must play a role in the 
region’s industrialization. One view of that role argues that an agricultural 
transformation is a necessary precursor to an industrial transformation. Two factors 
suggest that this type of agriculture-led industrialization strategy is of limited relevance 
to contemporary Africa—lack of technological innovations in African agriculture and 
globalization. An alternative way in which agriculture can support industrialization is 
via agro-industry specific value chains. This approach appears to hold more promise as 
an industrialization strategy, but the strategic and policy interventions needed to boost 
                                                 
1  The international community—a key partner in Africa’s economic story—also virtually abandoned 
interest in growth in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals.  
2  For further discussion of deindustrialization see FionnaTregenna’s contribution to this volume.   2
value chain-based agro-industrial production are similar to those needed for an 
industrialization strategy in general.  
Section 4 presents an industrialization strategy for Africa. It outlines two broad areas of 
public action. The first is the less controversial: continuing the investment climate 
reforms urged by the international financial institutions, but with greater emphasis on 
public action in infrastructure, skills, and regional integration. The second is more likely 
to provoke debate: Africa must learn to compete through strategic actions to create an 
export push, to develop industrial clusters, and to attract task-based production. Section 
5 concludes. 
2  Why industrialize?  
After stagnating for much of its post-colonial history, economic performance in Africa 
markedly improved after 1995. Between 1994 and 2008, average economic growth was 
close to 5 per cent per year. And, while Africa did not escape the global crisis of 2008–
09, its impact was relatively mild. The region managed to avoid a contraction in 2009, 
growing by 2 per cent, and grew by about 5 per cent in 2010. Growth is projected to 
accelerate to 6 per cent in 2011 (IMF 2010). However, Africa’s growth, both before and 
after the crisis, is fragile. In a series of papers Arbache and Page (2007; 2008; 2009) use 
a new approach to the analysis of ‘growth episodes’ to assess Africa’s growth 
turnaround.3 They find that the improvement in economic performance in Africa after 
1995 was due largely to avoiding the catastrophic economic policy mistakes of the 
1980s. This resulted in a substantial reduction in the frequency and severity of growth 
collapses. Growth accelerations were confined mainly to mineral rich economies.  
What is missing from Africa’s growth story is structural change. There is little evidence 
that significant changes in structural variables underpinned more rapid growth between 
1995 and 2005 (Go and Page 2008; Arbache and Page 2009). Like the 1995–2005 
growth turnaround, the region’s post-crisis recovery has been driven primarily by fewer 
mistakes, commodity prices and the recovery of domestic demand. Without major 
changes in economic structure Africa remains vulnerable to shocks and to a long-run 
decline in commodity prices.  
2.1  What Africa makes matters: structural change, diversity, and sophistication 
The 1980s and 1990s were marked by a shift of manufacturing production out of Africa. 
Excluding South Africa, the region’s share of global manufacturing production fell from 
0.4 per cent in 1980 to 0.3 per cent in 2005, and its share of world manufactured exports 
from 0.3 to 0.2 per cent (UNIDO 2009). Table 1 compares selected indicators of 
industrial development for Africa and all developing countries in 2005. The share of 
manufacturing in GDP is about one third of the average for developing countries, and in 
contrast with developing countries as a whole, it is declining.4 Per capita manufactured 
output and exports are less than 20 and 10 per cent of the developing country average, 
                                                 
3  Important contributions to this literature on growth episodes – focused on growth accelerations only—
include Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) and Jones and Olken (2005).  
4  In this volume, Adam Szirmai documents the processes of deindustrialization in sub-Saharan Africa 
between 1950 and 2005.    3
respectively. The region has low levels of manufactured exports in total exports and of 
medium- and high-tech goods in manufactured exports. Particularly worrying is the fact 
that these measures have changed little since the 1990s (UNIDO 2009).  
That Africa has experienced so little structural change through industrialization is 
worrying in itself, but recent research on structural change within industry points to two 
further threats to the region’s long-run growth, lack of diversity, and sophistication. 
Globally, countries with more diversified production and export structures have higher 
incomes per capita, and countries that produce and export more sophisticated 
products—those that are primarily produced by countries at higher income levels—tend 
to grow faster. Both of these stylized facts suggest that what Africa makes, matters. 
Poor countries tend to specialize in a fairly narrow range of activities. Across a wide 
range of incomes, however, the diversity of what a country produces increases with the 
level of per capita income (Imbs and Wacziarg 2003). The relationship between 
diversity in production and income per capita is not solely a product of structural change 
between primary production and manufacturing. Within the manufacturing sector new 
product lines are introduced and new activities are taken up in existing sectors until 
countries reach quite high levels of income. At that point specialization in production 
again increases, resulting in a U-shaped relationship between specialization and per 
capita income. Other research indicates that the same U-shaped relationship holds for 
export diversification (Cadot, Carrère, and Strauss-Kahn 2011). As per capita incomes 
rise, exports diversify within existing product lines and through the introduction of new 
products.  
Two empirical studies also find a strong, positive relationship between the level of 
‘sophistication’ of a country’s industrial production and export structure and its 
subsequent growth (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 2007; UNIDO 2009). In this work 
the degree of sophistication of a product or export is measured by the per capita 
incomes of the countries that ‘intensively’ produce (export) it. If mostly high-income 
countries produce (export) a product, the income level associated with the product is 
high and the product is classified as sophisticated. Products mainly produced (exported) 
by low-income countries are classified as unsophisticated. Developing countries that 
produce and export a high proportion of products that are mainly produced by richer 
economies grow faster.5 
Figure 1 plots the relationship between the production sophistication of the 
manufacturing sector of each country in the UNIDO database (on the vertical axis) and 
per capita GDP (on the horizontal axis). The index of production sophistication is 
constructed in two steps. First, the sophistication of each International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) 3-digit manufacturing sector is measured by the 
weighted average of the per capita GDP of all countries producing goods in the sector. 
The weights are the production intensities of the sector—the ratio of the value added 
share of the sector in a country’s total manufacturing value added relative to the sector’s 
value added share in world manufacturing value added—in each producing country 
                                                 
5  Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007)argue that their econometric evidence points to the relationship 
running from greater sophistication to growth.The relationship is robust to a number of specifications 
and treatments for two-way causality.UNIDO (2009) uses a different approach to address the 
endogeneity problem and arrives at similar results.   4
(normalized to 1).6 Next, country level manufacturing production sophistication is 
calculated as the weighted average of each country’s individual sectoral sophistication 
indices, where the weights are the share of manufacturing value added of each sector. 
Figure 2 repeats the exercise for export sophistication, where the weights now refer to 
export intensities and export shares. 
The regression line indicates the cross-section ‘average’ level of manufacturing 
production sophistication associated with a given level of development. By the nature of 
its construction, the country measure of sophistication shows a high positive correlation 
with aggregate per capita income levels. OECD countries cluster around the regression 
line in the upper right of each graph. The African economies in the sample are 
concentrated in the lower left corner of each figure.  
Because the indices of production sophistication are measured in current US$ it is not 
possible to compare sophistication levels from year to year directly, since they are 
affected by price changes. The relevant comparison in the figures is the distance from 
the predicted relationship. Countries substantially above or below the regression line are 
of considerable interest. Positive outliers produce goods more typical of countries at 
higher levels of income. Countries below the regression line produce goods that are less 
sophisticated than would be predicted by their levels of income.  
Moving between the figures from earliest to latest traces the path of economic 
development and manufacturing sophistication for individual economies. The paths 
taken by such successful industrializing economies as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and South Korea move up and to the right in these figures, reflecting the positive 
association between product and export sophistication and per capita income growth. 
China and India stand out among the low-income countries. Early on both economies 
had structures of manufacturing production that were significantly more sophisticated 
than those associated with their level of per capita income. In India’s case, however, its 
manufactured export sophistication was more in line with predicted values. 
The concept of sophistication combines the more traditional idea of technological 
sophistication based on process technology with ‘firm capabilities’, the tacit knowledge 
and working practices embodied in the firm’s work force, into a single measure of 
productivity.7 Sophisticated products embody advanced country productivity levels 
along both dimensions. The ability of firms in lower-income economies to produce, and 
especially, export sophisticated goods indicates that they have mastered both the 
‘hardware’ (process technology) and the ‘software’ (management practice, quality 
control and value chain management) required to produce such goods at an earlier level 
of development than might be expected. Low-income economies with a high 
                                                 
6  Production intensity indicates whether a country’s production in a sector is more or less concentrated 
than the world average.Hence, changes in production intensity indicate whether an economy is 
entering or leaving a sector relative to the evolving structure of global production.This approach is 
analogous to the use of revealed comparative advantage for exports by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 
(2007). 
7  UNIDO (2009) discusses the ranking of products by sophistication of process technology. For an 
introduction to the concept of firm capabilities see Sutton (2005).   5
concentration of such firms are likely to exhibit more rapid productivity growth in 
manufacturing.8 
The UNIDO (2009) study represents a first attempt to look simultaneously at the impact 
of both diversity and sophistication on growth. Tracing the evolution of industrial 
structure over time for economies classified by initial level of income and growth 
performance UNIDO finds that fast growing low- and middle-income countries both 
diversified and increased the sophistication of their production and export structures 
between 1975 and 2005. Slowly growing low- and middle-income countries in contrast 
were less successful at diversifying, and performed especially poorly in terms of 
increasing product and export sophistication.  
2.2  Diversity and sophistication have declined in Africa 
Since the middle of the 1970s Africa has been making fewer of the kinds of industrial 
products that matter for its growth. Between 1975 and 2005, the sophistication of the 
manufacturing sector in 16 of the 18 African economies in the UNIDO database 
declined, relative to predicted values. The results are more mixed for exports. About 
half of the African countries in the sample increased the sophistication of their export 
bundle relative to their level of income while the other half moved in the opposite 
direction. None of the African countries in the sample had the movement up and to the 
right characteristic of successful industrializers. In contrast with more rapidly growing 
countries, the diversity and sophistication of the region’s manufacturing sectors and its 
per capita incomes stagnated.  
Figure 3 shows how two classes of industrial activity—low-sophistication products and 
high-sophistication products—have evolved in Africa between 1975 and 2003 relative 
to several comparators.9 The average production intensity for the country product group 
is plotted along the vertical axis. The beginning point of each arrow in the figure marks 
the average production intensity for the country-product group in 1975–80. The tip of 
the arrow marks the average production intensity for the period after 1995.10 A value of 
0, marked by the horizontal line, indicates that the average production intensity for the 
country-product group is equal to the global average.  
In the period since 1975 fast growing low-income countries—Africa’s most relevant 
comparator—captured an increasing share of global production in both high 
sophistication and—driven mainly by the explosive growth of apparel manufacturing—
low sophistication sectors. Thus, the fast growing low-income countries have become 
increasingly diversified and sophisticated. Africa in contrast failed to keep pace with the 
fast growing low-income countries in low sophistication sectors and was exiting high 
sophistication production. Production intensities increased marginally in low 
sophistication sectors and declined in high sophistication sectors. The region’s 
                                                 
8  For further discussion see UNIDO (2009).  
9  Manufacturing activities are classified as ‘sophisticated’ if they have an index value of US$13,500 or 
above for the period after 1995 (regardless of their values in the earlier periods). Unsophisticated 
activities are classified as those with values below US$10,000 in 1995. The omitted category of 
products lies between those two bounds. See the notes to Figures 4 and 5 for the sectoral breakdown.  
10 The final year of the series is 2003 in the case of production and 2005 in the case of exports.   6
manufacturing base was becoming less diverse and at the same time less sophisticated. 
The decline in manufacturing sophistication was especially sharp in the region’s early 
industrializers—Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia.  
Figure 4 repeats the analysis for exports. Here again there is little structural change and 
the contrast between the fast growing low-income countries and the sample of African 
countries is equally stark. Fast growing low-income countries increased export 
intensities in both low sophistication and high sophistication sectors, indicating 
increasing revealed comparative advantage in both categories of exports. The Africa 
economies increased export intensities in low sophistication goods, but much more 
slowly and had virtually unchanged export intensities in high sophistication sectors. 
Relative to the fast growers, African manufactured exports were also becoming more 
concentrated and less sophisticated. 
Putting the production and export stories together, what appears to have taken place in 
Africa during the 1980s and 1990s was a narrowing of the production and export 
structure in manufacturing and a shift toward less sophisticated activities. This is 
consistent with the closure of non-competitive, import substitution industries—many of 
them state owned—following the trade liberalizations and privatizations of the 
adjustment period. At the high sophistication end African manufacturers were not able 
to compete with OECD and middle-income developing country suppliers. Africa lost 
ground in high sophistication sectors. Those manufacturing activities that remained 
following trade liberalization were more competitive internationally. As a consequence, 
revealed comparative advantage in low sophistication goods increased somewhat. That 
was the good news. The bad news was that competitive pressure from Asia—as a global 
supplier of such products as clothing and footwear—meant that low sophistication 
production and exports from Africa grew very little relative to the evolving global 
structure of production and exports.  
3  Agriculture and industrialization 
A majority of Africans continue to work in agriculture, and any new approach to 
industrialization must consider its relevance to industrial development. There is a large 
literature that argues that successful cases of industrialization are rare in the absence of 
a prior agricultural transformation.11 This section examines two perspectives on the 
relationship between industry and agriculture in Africa. The first argues that an 
agricultural transformation is needed before industrial growth can take off. For the 
majority of Africa’s economies there are two reasons to be skeptical of such an 
agricultural-led industrialization strategy, the limited range of technological innovations 
available to transform African agriculture and the globalization of both agriculture and 
manufacturing. A second, and more promising, view is that productivity change in 
agriculture can boost industrial development by supporting global value chains in agro-
industrial products.  
                                                 
11 For a survey see World Bank (2008).   7
3.1 Agriculture-led  industrialization 
Since the early 1970s John Mellor and others have championed the concept of 
agriculture-led industrialization, based mainly on their interpretations of the industrial 
revolution in Britain and the East Asian Miracle.12 The intellectual architecture of 
agriculture-led industrialization is grounded in the closed, dual economy model. In its 
simplest form the story follows these lines. Agricultural growth is driven by 
productivity improvements in smallholder agriculture, either in the form of new 
technologies for the production of existing crops, as in the Green Revolution, or the 
introduction of new higher value added crops, such as fruits and vegetables. The 
increases in agricultural productivity raise farm household incomes and in turn lead to 
higher expenditures on non-agricultural goods, stimulating the growth of the industrial 
and services sectors. In the absence of international trade productivity growth is also 
needed to restrain increases in the price of food, the urban wage good, as the urban 
economy expands. The evidence in support of agriculture-led industrialization comes 
largely from research showing that the consumption multipliers from growth in 
agriculture are higher than from other sectors (Mellor 1995; World Bank 2008). 
This view of the role of agriculture in industrial development leads to seemingly 
paradoxical policy advice. For industrialization to succeed it is necessary first to focus 
on an agricultural transformation, raising land productivity and creating more efficient 
market links between urban and rural areas. Only after these public actions have taken 
place should governments turn to industrial development. In Africa this approach to 
industrialization has found concrete expression in Ethiopia, where since 1993 the 
growth and development strategy has been built on ‘agricultural development‐led 
industrialization’.13 
For an agriculture-led industrialization strategy to succeed, Africa would need a ‘double 
green revolution’, combining new agricultural technologies with adaptation to its huge 
diversity of ecosystems (Otsuka 2010). The need for new innovations is made even 
more urgent by climate change which is likely to pose a significant threat to African 
agriculture. The Stern Review (Stern 2007) points to some potentially dramatic shifts in 
agricultural productivity due to global warming. Agriculture in higher latitude 
developed countries is likely to benefit from moderate warming (2–3
oC), while even 
small amounts of warming in tropical regions will lead to yield declines. Stern estimates 
that impacts of global warming will be highest in Africa. This is because crops are 
already close to critical temperature thresholds and most of the countries have limited 
adaptation potential in agriculture. 
However, the innovations on which an agriculture-led industrialization strategy could be 
based are not likely to be available. Although modern agricultural biotechnology has the 
                                                 
12 The cases of Hong Kong and Singapore are dismissed by these authors as city states and therefore 
unique. 
13 For a large, landlocked agrarian economy such as Ethiopia the logic of the agriculture first strategy 
cannot be dismissed out of hand, although as Dercon and Zeitlin (2009) point out the evidence 
supporting such an approach is not wholly persuasive. Even in Ethiopia rapid increases in agricultural 
yields over more than ten years have failed to generate corresponding increases in industrial 
production. Recently, the government in Ethiopia has modified the strategy to include more activist 
industrial development policies.   8
potential to transform African agriculture, Africa has banned the use of genetically 
modified (GM) crops. Therefore, very little research will be conducted on the 
biotechnology innovations most relevant to the region. Even if the GM ban were lifted 
within the next few years, because the lead time between research and application is 
around 15 years, new technologies would not become available until around 2030 
(Collier 2010). The lack of appropriate technologies for African agriculture is 
exacerbated by the collapse of agricultural innovation and extension systems across the 
continent (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and GehlSampath 2010). 
Openness to trade fundamentally changes a key assumption underpinning the 
agriculture-led industrialization strategy. Over the past 25 years multilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements have opened all of Africa’s economies and those of its major 
markets to international trade in both manufactured and agricultural products. These 
global changes mean that industry no longer needs a growing domestic market for its 
continued growth. Exports provide a far larger market. Rural‐urban migration and rising 
urban demand no longer need result in sustained increases in the relative price of food; 
imports can substitute for domestic production.  
The fact that an agriculture-led industrialization strategy may be inappropriate for 
contemporary Africa does not mean, however, that it is possible to ignore agricultural 
development. Given the large relative size of Africa’s rural economy, productivity 
growth in agriculture is needed to raise rural incomes and reduce poverty. In a world of 
increasing food price volatility it also represents a means to dampen food price inflation. 
And, improvements in the productivity and quality of high value agricultural crops can 
make it possible to enter global agro-industrial value chains. Rather than leading 
industrial development, it is essential that productivity growth and greater market 
integration in agriculture proceed together with industrialization.  
3.2  Entering global value chains  
The idea of ‘adding value’ to agricultural commodities prior to export has a long history 
in Africa. It continues to have relevance today. Modern agro-industry covers a broad 
range of activities. At one extreme agricultural processing can involve the 
transformation of agricultural raw materials into a variety of processed products. This 
traditional linkage between agriculture and industry remains underexploited in Africa in 
part due to deficiencies in the supply of agricultural inputs and in part due to cascading 
tariffs in importing countries—particularly in Asia—that discriminate against the export 
of higher stage processed goods. At the other extreme there is the expanding global 
trade in horticultural products and flowers. Keeping products fresh (maintaining the 
cool chain) and transferring them quickly from farm to shelf adds value. Value is also 
added through packaging, preparation, and innovation.  
Global markets for agro-industrial products have become more challenging in recent 
years for two reasons: 
•  Standards: both the range of items covered by mandatory standards and the 
stringency of standards have increased, and compliance with standards has 
become more complicated because of a shift from product standards, largely 
enforced through testing at borders, towards controls over the way that products 
are grown, harvested, processed and transported.   9
•  Product requirements: global buyers’ requirements include volume, speed, and 
reliability of delivery, customization of products through processing and 
packaging, and product safety.  
Because of these challenges, global agro-industry is increasingly dominated by value 
chain relationships in which lead firms coordinate the vertical supply chain (World 
Bank 2003). These lead firms have taken on many of the characteristics associated with 
modern manufacturing, including driving product differentiation and innovation, quality 
assurance based on risk management, and process control (Humphrey and Memedovic 
2006). 
In agro-processing, cut flowers, and horticultural exports the coordination, management 
and control challenges posed by entering global value chains are closer to those of 
manufacturing than traditional agriculture, and the policy actions needed to spur their 
growth are the same as those needed to meet the industrialization challenge more 
generally. Successful agro-industrial exporting calls for developing logistics capability. 
Physical infrastructure is critical at points of export (airports and seaports) and in 
connecting production centres to ports (roads and rail). Value chain coordination puts a 
premium on effective communication. This requires investment in information and 
communication technology. The standards infrastructure is particularly important for 
success in global markets. Finally, given the importance of business service 
requirements in agro-industrial value chains, the support services needed by agricultural 
producers are closer to business development services than to agricultural extension 
(Humphrey and Memedovic 2006). 
4  Toward an industrial development strategy  
The state-led, import substitution strategies of the 1960s and 1970s produced industry 
without efficiency. The distortions to the price system and the subsidies from the public 
purse were simply too great for the region’s industrial enterprises to be sustainable in 
the long-run. The adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s, however, produced 
efficiency without industry. Liberalized international trade benefited the consumers of 
industrial products, weeded out obviously non-competitive firms, and improved the 
allocation of investment, but industry failed to grow, even in the product lines that 
remained competitive following the economic reforms. Restoring industrial growth in 
Africa will require a new set of policies and public actions. This section sets out two 
elements of an industrialization strategy.  
4.1  Improving the investment climate 
Reacting to the unsuccessful and sometimes disastrous results of Africa’s early 
experiment with industrialization, policy attention since the mid-1990s—especially 
from the international donor community—has tended to focus on the costs of doing 
business. These have been well-documented in a decade of comparative research 
sponsored by the World Bank and the World Economic Forum and are summarized in 
the report of the Commission on Growth and Development (2008). Much of the 
difference in industrial performance between Africa and other developing countries can 
be traced to differences in the ‘investment climate’—the physical, institutional, and 
regulatory environment within which private investors make their decisions. Overall,   10
the cost of doing business in Africa is 20–40 per cent above that for other developing 
regions.
14 
The reform agenda for the investment climate has centred on economy-wide reforms in 
trade, regulatory, and labour market policies, designed to reduce the role of government 
in economic management. While these policy and institutional reforms are perhaps 
necessary, they have not proved to be sufficient to increase investment and growth, 
especially in Africa.
15 At a minimum the government and donor view of the investment 
climate needs to be broadened to encompass three critical business environment factors 




Firm level studies of productivity in Africa highlight infrastructure deficiencies as a 
significant barrier to greater competitiveness (Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran 2005; 
Yoshino 2008). Although indicators of infrastructure access rose between the 1990s and 
2000s this was mainly in communications technology, water supply, and sanitation. 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continues to lag at least 20 percentage points behind the 
average for low-income countries on almost all major infrastructure measures.17 In 
addition the quality of service is low, supplies are unreliable, and disruptions are 
frequent and unpredictable (Table 2).  
There has been little strategic orientation of Africa’s infrastructure investments to 
support industrial growth and little willingness on the part of Africa’s development 
partners to finance infrastructure investments (World Bank 2007a; Page 2011). Road 
infrastructure has received scant attention, and although concessions have been awarded 
to operate and rehabilitate many African ports and railways and some power distribution 
enterprises, financial commitments by the concessionaire companies are often small. 
Access to communications services has increased dramatically, thanks to the cellular 
revolution, but high-speed data transmission critical to exporting lags badly.  
4.1.2 Skills   
Africa’s skills gap with the rest of the world is large and growing. While East Asian 
countries increased secondary enrolment rates by 21 percentage points and tertiary 
enrolment rates by 12 percentage points between 1990 and 2002, Africa raised its 
secondary rates by seven percentage points and its tertiary rates by only one percentage 
                                                 
14  See for example the Doing Business surveys by the World Bank or the Africa Competitiveness Report 
by the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. 
15 The relationship between ‘doing business’ reforms and investment, industrial development, and 
growth has not been well established empirically. Doing Business (2011) asserts that 656 articles have 
been published in peer-reviewed academic journals and about 2,060 working papers have been written 
using the eight years of available data. It is notably selective, however, in reviewing the evidence 
presented in these papers. Notably, a number of rapid industrializers in South East Asia and Central 
America score as badly on the Doing Business surveys as many African economies (See Page 2011). 
16  For a fuller exposition of these arguments see Page (2011). 
17 An important exception is the penetration of fixed-line and mobile telephones, where SSA leads low-
income countries by as much as 13 percent. The largest gaps are for rural roads (29 percentage points) 
and electricity (21 percentage points).   11
point. Real expenditure on tertiary education in Africa fell by about 28 per cent between 
1990 and 2002, and expenditure per pupil declined from US$6,800 in 1989 to US$1,200 
in 2002. Staff student ratios in West African universities increased from 1:16 in 1990 to 
1:32 in 2007 (World Bank 2007b).  
The skills gap poses a major potential constraint to Africa’s industrial development. 
Employer surveys report that African tertiary graduates are weak in problem solving, 
business understanding, computer use, and communication skills (World Bank 2007b). 
Cross-country research indicates that there is a strong empirical link between export 
sophistication and the percentage of the labour force that has completed post-primary 
schooling (World Bank 2007b). There is also some evidence to suggest that enterprises 
managed by university graduates in Africa have a higher propensity to export (Wood 
and Jordan 2002; Clarke 2005), and more robust evidence shows that among firms 
owned by indigenous entrepreneurs, those with university-educated owners tend to have 
higher growth rates (Ramachandran and Shah 2007). 
4.1.3 Regional  integration   
The small size of Africa’s economies and the fact that many are landlocked make 
regional approaches to the common problems that affect trade and industrialization—
infrastructure in trade corridors, institutional and legal frameworks (customs 
administration, competition policy, and regulation of transport) and trade related 
services—imperative. For exporters in landlocked countries poor infrastructure in 
neighbouring, coastal economies, incoherent customs and transport regulations, 
inefficient customs procedures, and ‘informal taxes’ in transport corridors slow transit 
times and raise costs.  
Tangible progress on trade logistics in Africa’s regional groupings has been slow. 
Investments in regional infrastructure are hampered by the technical complexity of 
multi-country projects and the time required for decisions by multiple governments. 
Institutional reforms—such as common standards, regulations, and one-stop border 
facilities—have also failed to materialize. Africa’s development partners have also not 
been helpful, preferring to deal with individual countries rather than regional 
organizations and limiting financial commitments to trans-border projects.  
4.2  Learning to compete 
It is not surprising, given Africa’s past experiments with industrialization that African 
governments and the international development community have chosen to focus on the 
regulatory environment. Reforms to reduce the role of government in economic 
decision-making are easily measured and understood.18 They may not, however, 
correctly identify the binding constraints to industrial development in Africa. Shifting 
focus to the obvious deficiencies in infrastructure, skills, and regional integration is an 
important first step toward accelerating the pace of industrialization. But public actions 
to improve the investment climate may not be sufficient to reverse Africa’s increasing 
marginalization in global manufacturing.  
                                                 
18 The annual World Bank Doing Businessreport goes so far as to publish a league table of the ‘cost of 
doing business’ and a list of ‘top reformers’.   12
In low-income countries there are large differences in productivity levels across firms, 
even in the same industry. While poorer countries have some firms that achieve world 
class productivity levels, they also have a higher percentage of low productivity firms.19 
Closing the productivity gap between African industry and the rest of the world will be 
essential, if Africa has any hope of breaking into global markets for manufactured 
goods. Today, new entrants to manufacturing are no longer only competing with the 
high-wage OECD, as China was when it entered the market. They are competing with 
‘factory Asia’, and in the absence of more rapid firm level productivity growth, the 
differences in wages between East Asia and Africa may not be sufficiently large to 
offset Asia’s productivity advantage. 
The problem of breaking in raises an old policy question with a contentious history: can 
public policy help African firms learn to compete? The debate about what, if anything, 
governments can do to increase firm level productivity is at the heart of the decades-
long controversy over industrial policy. Advocates of selective policies to promote 
productivity growth emphasize the success of some East Asian economies including 
China. Skeptics remain unconvinced.
20 However, an industrialization strategy for Africa 
need not confront the choice between ‘picking winners’ and ‘levelling the playing 
field’. Rather, it can deploy the existing arsenal of public policies—including those 
related to the investment climate—toward three broad strategic objectives focused on 
learning to compete: creating an export push, encouraging industrial agglomerations, 
and attracting task-based production.  
4.2.1  Creating an export push 
There is substantial evidence that African manufacturing firms improve their 
productivity by exporting (Soderbom and Teal 2002; Milner and Tandrayen 2004; 
Mengistae and Pattillo 2004). Bigsten et al. (2004) find that, controlling for self-
selection, African firms enhance their productivity by around 9 per cent per year if they 
export. The public policy implications of learning by exporting are straightforward but 
powerful. An ‘export push’ strategy, involving a concerted set of investments, policy 
and institutional reforms designed to increase the share of manufactured exports in 
GDP, can generate higher levels of economy-wide total factor productivity and more 
rapid growth.  
Creating an export push will require coordinated action across government to succeed. 
Trade reforms have brought tariffs down in Africa, and its trade regimes discriminate 
against exports to about the same degree as those of other regions worldwide, but a 
number of at the border reforms—especially to trade-related institutions—still remain to 
be undertaken to reduce anti-export bias. Duty drawback and tariff exemption schemes 
are often complex and poorly administered, resulting in substantial delays. Export 
                                                 
19 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for example show that these gaps are larger in China and India than in the 
USA, and that they have the potential to explain between a quarter and a third of the differences in 
aggregate productivity between the USA and China and India in the manufacturing sector. 
20 The report of the Commission on Growth and Development (2008) tries to have it both ways, 
concluding that the balance of the evidence suggests that proponents of selective industrial policies 
have failed to establish their general efficacy, but that some policy interventions have yielded positive 
results in individual country or institutional settings.   13
procedures—including certificates of origin, quality, and sanitary certification, and 
permits—are also burdensome (Clarke 2005).  
Beyond the border, surveys of manufacturing firms in African countries highlight—in 
addition to the obvious deficiencies in infrastructure—a number of areas of trade 
logistics that impose penalties on exporters; port transit times are long, customs delays 
on both imported inputs and exports are significantly longer for African economies than 
for China, and markets for transport services and handling are often insufficiently 
competitive (Yoshino 2008). 
Africa’s success in boosting non-traditional exports may, however, ultimately depend as 
much on the actions of its international partners as on its own efforts. Aid agencies will 
need to support strategic investments in trade related infrastructure and institutions, 
mainly under the aegis of an adequately funded WTO ‘Aid for Trade’ initiative. In 
addition more advanced economies can reduce escalating tariffs directed at higher stage 
processing of Africa’s commodity exports and could offer a measure of trade 
preferences for its non-traditional exports.21 
4.2.2  Encouraging industrial clusters 
Manufacturing and service industries tend to concentrate in geographical areas, driven 
by common needs for inputs and access to markets, knowledge flows, and the need for 
specialized skills (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999; Sonobe and Otsuka 2006). 
There are significant productivity gains to firms from industrial agglomeration, making 
the public policy challenge posed by agglomeration daunting (Glaeser et al. 1992; 
Henderson 1997; Bigsten, Gebreeyesus, and Soderbom 2008). Starting a new industrial 
location is a form of collective action problem; if a critical mass of firms can be 
persuaded to locate in a new area, they will realize agglomeration economies, but no 
single firm has the incentive to locate in a new area in the absence of others. Because 
Africa has few modern industrial clusters, it is both more difficult for existing African 
firms to compete and more difficult to attract new industry to Africa.  
Given the low level of industrial export dynamism in most of Africa, linking export 
promotion and spatial policies in an export processing zone (EPZ) may be an attractive 
way of encouraging agglomeration. The main benefit of an EPZ is that it provides a 
clear focus for government investments and institutional reforms designed to encourage 
the location of firms in a specific area. It is also subject to an efficiency test—firms 
located in the cluster must be able to export. Case studies suggest that concentrating 
investment on high-quality infrastructure in a limited physical area is crucial. They also 
suggest that improving social services in an industrial zone to levels above national 
standards is highly desirable (UNIDO 2009). 
4.2.3  Attracting trade in tasks 
In some manufacturing activities the production process can be decomposed into a 
series of distinct steps, or tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006). As transport and 
coordination costs have fallen, it has become efficient for the production of different 
tasks to be located in different countries, each working on a different step in the process. 
Task-based production has expanded dramatically in the past 20 years. In 1986–90 
                                                 
21 See Collier and Venables (2007) for such a proposal.   14
imported intermediates constituted 12 per cent of total global manufacturing output and 
26 per cent of total intermediate inputs. By 1996–2000 these figures had risen to 18 per 
cent and 44 per cent, respectively. Exports use a substantially higher share of imported 
intermediate inputs than production for the domestic market, a ratio of about 2 to 1 
(UNIDO 2009).  
For countries that have failed to industrialize task-based production is a potential 
lifeline. It is easier to specialize in a single task than in the entire range of tasks needed 
to produce a product. But trade in tasks has also amplified the importance of trade 
logistics. Countries at the final stages in the production chain of a task-traded good are 
unlikely to be competitive if their trade logistics costs on imported intermediates are 
high, and countries hoping to enter upstream in a global value chain cannot afford to 
have high trade logistics costs for their exports. End stage tasks are highly mobile, and 
African economies can gain a foothold in task-based production through concerted 
programmes of investment promotion, provision of infrastructure, and improvements in 
trade-related institutions, beginning with the creation of world class EPZs. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper began by asking, should Africa industrialize? The answer to whether to 
industrialize is relatively straightforward: for the vast majority of the region’s 
economies the lack of structural change, industrial diversity and sophistication are 
powerful constraints to growth. The answer to how to industrialize is more complex. 
For several reasons agriculture is unlikely to lead industrialization in Africa, but it has 
important links to a successful industrial transformation. Improvements to the 
investment climate—the physical, institutional, and policy environment within which 
firms operate—are still needed, but public policy needs to shift from a focus on stroke 
of the pen changes to regulations to embrace actions to close the infrastructure gap, 
create new skills, and achieve meaningful regional integration.  
To break in to global markets Africa must raise the productivity of its enterprises. Here 
the role of public policy is more controversial. Africa’s past experiments at 
industrialization were largely unsuccessful, and there has been a tendency to dismiss the 
idea of industrial policy as inappropriate or unworkable in Africa. This view of 
industrial policy as ‘picking winners’ misses the point. What is missing in Africa 
beyond the investment climate is a coherent, strategic set of public actions to support 
productivity growth. Creating an export push, encouraging industrial clusters, and 
attracting task-based production offer an opportunity to give Africa a new start on 
learning to compete.  
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Table 1: Selected Indicators of industrial development (2005) 















































487.2 10.05  75.8  57.3 372.9  21.7 1.14 
Source: UNIDO (2009), author’s calculations. 
 
Table 2: Impact of unreliable infrastructure services on the productive sector 
Service problem  SSA 
Developing 
countries 
    
Electricity 
Delay in obtaining electricity connection (days)  79.9  27.5 
Electrical outages (days per year)  90.9  28.7 
Value of lost output due to electrical outages (per cent of 
turnover) 
6.1 4.4 
Firms maintaining own generation equipment (per cent of total)  47.5  31.8 
    
Telecommunications 
Delay in obtaining telephone line (days)  96.6  43.0 
Telephone outages (days per year)  28.1  9.1 
Source: World Bank (2007a). 
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Figure 1: Production sophistication and per capita income 1975 and 1995 
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Figure 2: Export sophistication and per capita income 1976 and 2000 
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Figure 3: Production intensities by level of sophistication 
 
 
































































































>0 LOW INTENSITY  22
Figure 4: Export Intensities by level of sophistication 
 
 
Source: UNIDO (2009), authors’ calculations. 
Notes to Figures 3 and 4: The vertical axis represents the logarithm of production intensity, such that a value of zero 
indicates world average intensity. A value of 0.5 (1) is equivalent to 165% (265%) of world average, while a value of -0.5 
(-1) equates to 61% (37%) of world average intensity. The division between low- and high-sophistication is based on the 
sector rankings presented in UNIDO (2009). The ‘high-sophistication’ group is made up of the fabricated metals (381), 
machinery (382), electrical machinery (383), transport (384), equipment (385), furniture (332) and printing & publishing 
(342) sectors. the ‘low-sophistication’ group is made up of the food (311), beverages (312), tobacco (313) textiles (321), 
leather (323), footwear (324) and rubber (355) sectors. 
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